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pointed out above. When an attorney finds a physician skilled in these
techniques of testifying, he tends to try to use him again and again.
The problem for the legal system in this trend, however, lies in the
fact that this highly-prized type of medical witness may not be the most
expert on the medical issues involved. In particular, he may not be
among the more advanced and progressive clinicians who have the most
to offer.
Another very important factor in the tendency toward professional
witnesses is the reluctance of many clinical physicians to appear in court.
If it is agreed that we need to expand the lists of medical witnesses available for use in legal matters, then films such as this one and others like
it will serve an excellent purpose if they can help to persuade qualified
physicians to give some of their time to the courts.
It is up to counsel and the bench to help in this effort to attract more
physician witnesses. They must ease the way, making it more convenient
and less traumatic to appear in court. And perhaps we could do something about requiring a bit less in the way of "preparation" for the medical witness than might have been indicated in this film.
WILLIAM J.

NATIONAL COMMUNISM AND SOVIET STRATEGY.

CURRANt

By Dinko A. To-

masic. Washington, D. C.: Public Affairs Press, 1957.
$4.50.

Pp. viii, 222.

Europeans residing in this country frequently express their bewilderment at American political life. Understanding the differences between
the two political parties is particularly difficult for them. Their European experiences and concepts just do not fit in, and the pattern present
in the European dilemma between conservative and liberal, right and
left, Christian and Socialist, democratic and authoritarian offers little
help. The nature of political disagreement, or the essence of political
conflict between the two parties in America, eludes a foreigner's understanding. Persons in this country experience similar problems in understanding the political culture and conflicts that inhere in political systems differing from their own, particularly those of the Communist society. These difficulties are accelerated when a political conflict arises
within the Communist society-such as the one between the Communist
power-center in Moscow and the Communist regional power-center in
t
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the Balkans. The need to understand this conflict becomes something
more than academic curiosity when one considers that American taxpayers have contributed one and one half billion dollars to Yugoslavia in
economic and military aid.'
Professor Tomasic's book most adequately meets the need for an
understanding of political conflict in the Communist society. His analysis centers around the conflict within the Communist movement brought
to the fore by the split between the Yugoslav Communist Party and
Moscow. This conflict, however, is treated in a broad context of its
causes and impact such as the structure of the Communist parties and
states; the dependence of these parties and states on Moscow; the role
of Communist strategy and tactics; the application of this strategy in
Yugoslavia; the physiognomy of the Yugoslav Party and its ethnical
and psychological factors.
The case of the Yugoslav Communist Party is not an isolated phenomenon of political conflict within the Communist orbit. Tensions
provoked by the pressing power-center in Moscow have caused rebellions
early in the history of the Communist state life. For example, Tomasic
cites the rebellions in 1924 and 1932 in Outer Mongolia and the silent
conflict between Stalin and Mao Tse Tung. The only outstanding
characteristic of these rebellions is that they were neither spectacular nor
successful. These and similar challenging internal forces have been silenced by Moscow through suppression and concealment. Thus, these
revolts did not jeopardize the monolithic unity of international Communism or the indisputable leadership of Moscow.
In contrast to these previous power conflicts in the Communist
orbit, the Yugoslav case is different for this conflict has been both spectacular and successful, ending with defeat of the central authority of the
Communist Party in Moscow.2 Here, Stalin and the leadership of Moscow were in a position where neither open force nor concealment could
be expediently applied. The political struggle between the two Communist parties has been performed on a lighted stage before the world
audience. The audience included, besides the cadres of both Parties, the
Parties of other iron curtain countries, as well as the socialist parties,
1. An estimate covering the years 1948-55. Time, June 6, 1955, p. 30.
2. This conflict may be segregated into two general periods: (1) The first period
of the conflict was introduced with expulsion of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia
from the Comminform in June, 1948-this period could be regarded as closed with
Stalin's death. (2) In the second period, normalization of relations between the Soviet
Union and Yugoslavia was sought. Soon after Stalin's death in 1953 and during 1954,
border incidents, mutual recrimination and adverse propaganda ceased. In May, 1955
Nikita S. Krushchev visited Belgrad in an attempt to mend the rift. As a result of
negotiations during this latter period, present relations between Yugoslavia and the
Soviet Union are characterized by a renewed spirit of close cooperation.
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neutrals and opponents of Communism. All these have been given a
general impression of a definite breakdown in the leadership of Moscow
on the one hand and the decomposition of the Communist world, on the
other.
Professor Tomasic recognizes that this impression is fairly understandable in the first period of the conflict. However, in view of the
circumstances arising later, this popular impression has proved erroneous,
thus the need arises for a wholly new appraisal of the situation. These
circumstances are: (1) the change of leadership in Moscow after Stalin's
death and (2) the persistency of the Yugoslav Communist Party in its
adherence to Marxism-Leninism. These two factors have rendered
possible a new type of unity in the Communist world. This unity has
been achieved through the revision of the inter-party relations which has
made possible the development of new concepts of strategy and tactics.
According to Tomasic, the Communist world has come out of this Yugoslav conflict more flexible in its strategy for the world conquest but
with no less determination and preparation. Let us now examine the
details of Professor Tomasic's analysis of this conflict.
Tomasic sees the essence of the conflict as occurring in the divergency of views concerning the strategy and tactics of Communist
movements between Moscow and the Yugoslav party leaders.
Lenin, in planning the universal victory of Communism, directed
his attention toward a careful elaboration of adequate tools for the accomplishment of this aim. Lenin assumed that the universal victory cannot be achieved without revolutionary, i.e. military, strife. Consequently,
he established a new type of party, equipped and trained for such conquest. As an inevitable strategical device of the Party, Lenin established
a central place of command, a general staff whose function was to coordinate all available forces that could be mustered against the enemy on
a global scale. The important question then was: who would be in
command of the international Communist movement, and where would
the central command be located. This was decided by the history of the
Communist Party itself.
The success of the Russian October Revolution firmly entrenched
Russia and Moscow as the world revolutionary center. On the basis
of this event, the Communists of Russia contended that the Soviet Union
was the "Fatherland of Socialism"-the lawful general headquarters
of the coming world revolution. Thus the economic as well as military
resources of the wide, former Czarist empire, were mobilized to support
the international revolutionary movement and to direct the Communist
Parties and auxiliary organizations throughout the world. Moscow be-
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came the mainspring of Communist moral fortitude and revolutionary
fervor. It inspired a faithful and almost religious awe from the usually
weak and meaningless parties, often persecuted and underground. Because of this particular character of the Communist Party, the rule of
the general headquarters was not confined to its strictly military and
political directives, but also took in hand the interpretation of Marxist
theory and philosophy. Consequently, the supreme authority in Moscow
was obeyed not only in its decisions concerning global or local strategy
and tactics, but its pronouncements on all ideological questions were considered infallible.
This attachment to Moscow was, on the other hand, rooted in the
very nature of the allegiance to the Communist Party as it was conceived
by Lenin. Allegiance to the Party called for a complete break with
the former religion, philosophy and nationality of its members. Particularly in the sphere of political and national allegiance of its members,
the Party demanded replacement of the old, bourgeois, national principle
of territorial authority with the new, universal and unifying principle
of personal, hierarchiacal authority of the Party order. Thus by Lenin's
concept of the Party's unity, the relations between the Party power-center
in Moscow and the Party units throughout the world were regulated.
In this structure there was no place for doubts about supremacy and
subordination. With this ordering of the Party, the monolithic unity
was upheld and total control over the different national units was successfully exercised until World War II.
Before World War II the whole weight of the Soviet Union, which
was then the only Communist power of significance, stood behind this
Leninist concept of party unity. But after World War II this objective
power situation changed. The orbit of Communist states spread over
one third of the earth's surface encompassing 900 million people. Collectively, non-Russian Communist states have surpassed the human, economic and military potential of the USSR. The process of Communist
absorption of different areas varied. This absorption did not always
take the form of a simple conquest, as was the case in the three small
Baltic states, or in the case of Hungary and Rumania. There were
different degrees of contribution among the native Communist Parties.
In accordance with that, the revolutionary merits, i.e., credit for the conquest, became a new factor. This was particularly true in such countries
as China and Yugoslavia. In both cases, the national Party leaders, Mao
and Tito, could claim with good right that the victory and the correlative
acquisition of power was not the result of blind obedience to the Party
power-center in Moscow, but oftentimes, the result of clear and per-
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sistent opposition to it.
To these factors one more must be added; one which has particular
significance in the case of Yugoslavia. That is the sphere of international
power configuration.'
Between World War I and II, the whole of
Eastern Europe, including Yugoslavia, belonged to the Anglo-French
sphere of political influence. Britain attempted to maintain this influence during the war. After Hitler's assault on Yugoslavia, a government
in exile was founded with its seat in London. From the remnants of
the Yugoslav army and with the semi-private Serbian military organization of the Chetniks, an armed resistance was organized and supported
by London. The Communist Party, on the other hand, and its general
staff in Moscow, had interests of their own in Eastern Europe. One of
the instruments of these interests was the Communist Party of Yugoslavia. The Communist Party of Yugoslavia organized its own guerrillas
after June 1941. This complicated the situation in the sense that military conflict between the two competing guerilla movements was unavoidable but the two protecting Allies, Russia and Great Britain, had a
mutual interest in avoiding, at least for the time being, any reciprocal
conflict. The Soviets under Stalin's leadership were particularly anxious
not to provoke the British. The second or third front in Europe was
pending, and its location was of considerable importance to the Soviets.
The consequence of this situation was that the Soviets pretended noninterference in the internal situation of Yugoslavia and insisted on the
independence of Tito's actions. This situation was highly advantageous
to Tito. He succeeded in preventing the British from landing on the
Balkan peninsula and at the same time avoided Soviet military occupation
of Yugoslavia. The result was the strengthening of his own position.
The following factors suggested the need for a change in interCommunist relations: (1) the change in the proportion of human and
material potential between Russians and non-Russians; (2) the variety
of ways utilized to spread Communism; (3) the differences in strength
and position of the native Parties; (4) strategic mistakes of Moscow
leadership and the revolutionary success of local leaders; (5) the given
international power configuration. Yet these objective components are
not sufficient to explain satisfactorily the dramatic events of the Yugoslav conflict with Moscow, its phases and perspectives. To make this
conflict as transparent as possible, Tomasic undertakes a detailed developmental analysis of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia. He presents the development of the CPY with a great insight into the Party's
3. Professor Tomasic analyzes this factor in c. V, British-Russia Rivalry in
Eastern Europe.
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structural, operational, and developmental problems. He does this with
a rare and detailed knowledge of Party personalities and events, bringing
out, in addition, a great amount of documentary material of primary importance. One of the most original aspects of his book is the interpretation of the development of the CPY and its leaders, as well as the conflict
with Moscow, in the light of this theory of personality and culture.
The basic tenet of the theory is that in conjunction with the local
geographic conditions and techniques of economic production depending
on them, two divergent cultures have come into existence in the Balkans.
One is that of the migratory herdsmen of the Dinaric mountains. Their
habitat is the mountainous area of central Yugoslavia that runs parallel
with the Adriatic Sea. The second is that of the sedentary tillers of the
soil in the lowland of the northwest. These contrasting cultures determine two different types of human characteristics. Thus the herdsmen's
social unit, "Kuca," contains autocratic and individualistic traits. Conversely, the tillers' basic social unit, "Zadruga," discloses democratic
and collectivistic traits. These different cultures result in two types of
personalities with distinct psychological characteristics. The dominant
psychological traits found in the Dinaric area, particularly in the regions
of Lika, Krajina, Kordun, Western Bosnia, Herzegovina and in the
major parts of Montenegro consist of a strongly developed sense of
honor and reputation, desire to do heroic deeds and readiness for selfsacrifice. The demand for social justice and individual freedom is very
strong. At the same time, however, inclination toward vindictiveness
and violence is also present. In the personalities of this type, emotional
instability prevails and sense of proportion is lacking.
The peasant farmers from the northwest plain, like their mountain
brethern, are renowned for their fighting spirit in behalf of justice and
against injustice, but have vastly different emotional reactions. The
peasant farmers rely on collective rather than individual action in matters
of common interest. They are apt to adopt mass passive resistance that
could be prolonged indefinitely. Although well-known for their stubbornness and slyness, they are disinclined to go to extremes in their behavior if the adversary is willing to meet them halfway.
Professor Tomasic contends that the first psychological type is
dominant among the majority of the Party members. The predominance
of this type of personality is due to the guerilla movement. During the
guerilla movement, many Dinaric mountaineers joined Party units. But
before the guerilla involvement, there were young students from the
Dinaric area (Montenegro and Bosnia) who provided the national universities in Zagreb and Beograd with a hard core of Party leaders' and
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activists. In short, the Communist Party with its militant spirit found
the most favorable response in this aggressive type of personality. Later
on, when the conflict with Moscow broke out, it was this same group
that contributed most vigorously to its dramatic development.
After World War II, the Party's power-center in Moscow endeavored to establish inter-Party relations according to Lenin's concepts. This attempt met definite obstacles in Yugoslavia. Along with
the changes in the objective power situation, the psychological factors appeared as a major obstacle in the realization of the usual concepts of
inter-Party relations. The great majority of the Yugoslav Party members and leaders considered themselves as having achieved the victory
in war without Russian help and in spite of her obstructions. There was
a strong tendency to overestimate themselves and underestimate others.
In the course of this self-glorification and self-dramatization, they developed a provocative and arrogant behavior not only toward the other
Communist Parties in Eastern Europe but also toward the Russian military and technical advisers. Instead of awe and deference due the representatives of the Party power-center in Moscow, they repeatedly expressed their feelings of superiority. Mentally captured by their own
grandeur and self-conceit, they were not hesitant to assert openly that
through their contribution to the success of the coup of Belgrad in
March 28, 1941,' they had forced Hitler to postpone his invasion of
Russia and thus prevented the Germans from occupying Moscow, and
so on. When Moscow's endeavor to establish "adequate" inter-Party
relations failed, i.e. when the Communist Party of Yugoslavia prevented
direct control of Party, state and army machinery, the conflict broke out
into the open. The Communist Party of Yugoslavia was expelled from
the Comminform. However, after Stalin's death, Moscow began to reconsider the possibility of a new concept of Party inter-relation and the
two conflicting Parties again approached each other. The determining
factor in Yugoslavia's action was the predominant role which Tito's
personality played.
Unlike the majority of his followers, Joseph Broz Tito comes from
lowland peasant stock in northwestern Croatia. He thus has the psychological traits of balance, endurance, sense of compromise and slyness.
These characteristics have made Tito indispensable to the otherwise
unruly and uncompromising members who form the core of the Party.
These same qualities, along with the expediency of the situation, have
4. On March 27-28, a group of air force officers, under the command of General
Dushan Simovich, overthrew the government, dismissed the Regency, forced Prince Paul
into exile and proclaimed King Peter Karadjordjevic of age.
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given Tito authority and significance in the Party and have aided him
in meeting the new compromise advanced by Moscow after Stalin's death.
Political literature dealing with the different aspects of Eastern
Europe do not always abound in outstanding contributions. The explanation for this is fairly easy. Eastern Europe is a relatively small
area with many twisted problems. These problems have their origin in
the diversity of nations, languages and religions which are the result of
disquiet centuries of political conflict between ascendence and fall of
dominant imperial powers. The difficulty in writing an objective and
balanced book on this part of the world is as immense as the difficulty
in establishing peace and order in this area. Tomasic's book almost approaches the ideal, at least insofar as Yugoslavia and her present situation is concerned. Under his skillful hand, a number of ramifications
of the Eastern Europe situation are lifted and analyzed for the first time,
e.g., the Party's strategic plans and their application in the area, human
materials and their cultural background and the psychology of personalities involved.'
It may be said, however, that Professor Tomasic has not given one
important point full consideration. In his explanation of the conflict, he
has confined his analysis to the psychological determinants of the personalities and has overlooked their rationality. Yet, the significance of
this factor seems very important. The rationality of Marxist-Leninist
doctrine is an undeniable fact. As such it gives by itself the appeal of
Communism. It may be conceded that the Marxist-Leninist doctrine was
of little or no importance to the bulk of "warlike but illiterate and semiliterate"' mountaineers who entered into the partisan guerilla movement
and subsequently into the Communist Party. Yet, the importance of the
rational acceptance of the Marxist-Leninist philosophy on the part of
the Party leaders is well illustrated in a recent book by Milovan Djilas.'
Djilas belonged to the generation of students caught in the turmoil
of Yugoslav national universities in the '30's. The various other political parties utilized radical and extremist methods similar to those of
the Communist Party. These other parties, equally as well as the Communist Party, should have appealed to students with Djilas' cultural
background. Yet, they chose Marxism. The motive for their choice must
have been something other than the psychological congeniality of the Communist Party. Djilas' motive is clearly pointed out in his recent book. In
5. See c. II, The National and Social Base of Communism of Yugoslavia; c. III,
Communist World Conspiracy and Rise of Tito; c. IV, Cultural Background of Yugoslavia's Civil War.
6. P. 113.
7. DJILAs, THE NEw CLASS 214 (1957).
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spite of the disappointment he met with Communist reality, Djilas still persists in his attachment to the Marxist philosophy, its interpretation of
society and its humanism. He, therefore retains a basic pattern of thinking
which is of dialectical materialism. In other words, the rational appeal
of the Communistic philosophy is one of the main reasons for some
people's adherence to the Party. Djilas' case is not an exception. It
has been proved that the great majority of the Communists who rejected
the Communist reality still maintain the basic tenets of the Communist
philosophy.
The above-mentioned point, however, does not have a direct bearing
to the main topic of Professor Tomasic's book but is significant as regards the reason for the adherence of many individuals to Communistic
philosophy even after rejecting a disillusioning Communistic reality.
Professor Tomasic's main topic is the clarification of the background of
the recent conflict in Communist society and in this regard, his book is
a real contributon and should prove most enlightening to the American
reader.
FEDOR I. CICAKj-

I Dr.
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